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RECENT CASES.
BANKRUPTcY-ALIMIONY-EFFECT UPON-IN RE NOWELL, 99 Fed. Rep. 930.-
Held, arrears in alimony upon which execution had not issued, did not in
Massachusetts constitute a probable debt which a discharge in bankruptcy would
bar. This is because its susceptibility to modification prevents its being a
fixed, absolute liability. Kerr v. Kerr (1897) 2 Q. B. 439; In re Lachemeyer,
Fed. Cas. No. 7966; In re Shefard, 97 Fed. 187; contra, In re Houston (D.
C.) 94 Fed. iig, following the Kentucky law; ln re Van Orden (D. C.) 96 Fed.
86, following New Jersey law, and In re Challoner, 98 Fed. 82, the law in
Illinois.
BILLS AND NOTES-INNOCENT PURCHASERS-WRITTEN INSTRUMENT-DENIAL
OF EXECUTION-WARMAN ET AL. V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF AKRON, OHIO, 57
N. E. 6 (Ill.).-The bank discounted two notes for appellant and gave credit to
the payees thereon. In an action by the bank to recover it was held, that in
order to prove that a bank discounting a note is an innocent purchaser, it is
not enough to show that the proceeds were placed in the payee's credit, by
way of deposit, but it must also be shown that the payee was not indebted to
the bank at the time, and that he has not since then and before notice to the
bank of the defenses to the note, withdrawn his account. Magruder, J., dis-
senting.
That tne bank had possession of the notes was prima facie sufficient proof
that it had acquired them bona fide for value, in the usual course of business.
Palmer v. Bank, 78 Ill. 380. Possession of the notes indorsed in bank by the
payee was prima facie evidence that the bank was their proper owner, and
nothing short of fraud would have sufficed to overcome the effect of such evi-
dence, or invalidate the title thus shown. Collins v. Gilbert, 94 U. S. 753.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuR PROCESS-ORDINANCE AS TO LICENSE FOR SALE
OF CIGARETTES-DISCRETION OF MAYOR-GUNDLING V. CITY OF CHICAGO, 20 Supt.
Ct. Rep. 63 3 .- The city of Chicago passed an ordinance regulating the sale of
cigarettes and imposing a license tax of $ioo, the fitness of the applicant to be
determined by the mayor. Plaintiff was convicted for selling without a
license.
Hetd, not to be a violation of the 14 th amendment requiring due process
of law, the power of the mayor was discretional and not arbitrary as in Y4ck
Wo v. Hofikins, iuS U. S. 356, and that also whether a license fee of $ioo par-
took of an excise tax or not, it violates no provision of the Federal Constitu-
tion, and was authorized by State.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PERSONAL LIBERTY-ADVERTISING BUSINESS-USE OF
FLAG-RUHSTRAT V. PEOPLE, 57- N. . 41 (Ill.).-The Act April 22, x899 (Ill),
prohibited the use of the national flag for any commercial purposes, or as an
advertising medium, and plaintiff was convicted for violation of that act and
brings error. Held, the act was unconstitutional. Cartwright, C. J., Wilkins
and Carter, J. J., dissenting. See Comment.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--SUNDAY LABOR-CLASS LEGISLATION-PET V.
STATE OF MINNESOTA, 20 Supt. Rep. 666.-The State of Minnesota passed a
statute forbidding all labor on Sunday except such as was of charity or neces-
sity, and further provided that keeping open barber shops on Sunday was not
to be deemed within the exceptions. Under this, plaintiff was tried and con-
victed for keeping open on Sunday. Held, such act was valid, being within
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the wise discretion of the State's police power, and was not class legislation.
Phillifis v. I1nnes, Clark F. 244; State v. Frederick, 45 Ark. 347: Orieni Ins.
Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557.
DAMTAGES-ToRTS-INTEREST ON LOSS-RECOVERY-N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R.
Co. v. ANSONIA LAND & WATER CO.. 46 Atl. Rep. 157 (Conn.).-Owing to neg-
ligence of defendant a section of railroad track was washed away, thus neces-
sitating an expenditure by plaintiff of a sum A for repairs and a sum B for
transfers meanwhile. The defendant might have known the amount of A at
the time of the injury. In an action to recover interest for delay in settlement
was allowed on A from date of accident; and also interest on B from the date
the amount became known to defendant. Held, no error.
Whenever one has knowledge or means of knowledge as to the amount of
damage another has suffered by his fault, there is an obligation of prompt
compensation resting on him, and the sufferer is not bound to inform him, un-
asked, as to the amount of his loss, Under such circumstances if a suit has
to be brought, damages for the delay may be added. Parrott v. R. R. Co.,
47 Conn. 575; Hubbard v. R. R. Co., 70 Con. 563. As B, the cost of trans-
ferring passengers and mail, was not a sum definitely ascertainable until the
bill of particulars was filed, after that date damages for the delay were allow-
able. Tighlman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136; New Haven Steam Saw Co. v. City
of Vew Haven, 72 Conn. 276, 287. Not only was the granting of the interest a
proper exercise of discretionary power by the court, but the plaintiff had a
right to such allowances.
EVIDENCE-ORAL TESTIMONY-WRITTEN AGREE3&ENT-DRYER V. SECURITY
FIRE INs. Co., 82 N. W. Rep. 494 (Ia.).-Where the owner of personal prop-
erty, being unable to read, was told by an insurance agent that he could move
his property after taking out insurance without loosing his protection, but the
written agreement in the policy forbade such removal. Hdd, the oral evi-
dence admissible to vary the terms of the written agreement.
We have found no precedent with facts identical with those of the present
case; similar decisions have been made, but the statements admitted to vary
the terms of the written policy were contained in the application. The pres-
ent case in admitting the verbal declarations of the agent for that purpose
seems clearly a departure. McConb v. Ils. Co., 83 Iowa 247; Stone v. Ins.
Co., 28 N. W. 47.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE REGULATION-CLEVEL&AIND, CINCINNATI, CHI-
CAGO & ST. L. R. R. v. ILUNOIS, 2o Supt. Ct., Rep. 723.-The State of Illinois
passed a statute providing that all passenger trains should stop a sufficient
length of time at the railroad stations of country seats to receive and let off
passengers with safety. The railroad alleged that local traffic was already
adequately provided for and such a requirement hampered their through trains.
Held, it did constitute such a burden; that after local requirements have been
satisfied, railroads have the legal right to adopt special provisions for through
traffic, interference with which is unreasonable.
This case is a good illustration of what is and what is not a direct burden
upon interstate commerce. The prior cases are collated and this seems to be
in conformity with them.
INSURANCE-KNOWLEDGE OF AGENT-NORTHERN ASSUR. Co. OF LONDON V.
GRAND VIEw BLDG. Assoc., ioi Fed. 77-When an insurance company issues
a policy containing a condition that it shall be void if there is other insurance
on the property without consent of the company and unindorsed on the policy,
and the agent who issues it knew of the existence of the other insurance but
did not indorse it. Held, such knowledge estopped company from enforcing
the condition.
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In Car enterv. Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495, itwas heldthatin order toinvoke the
doctrine of estoppel, the agent must endorse on the back of the policy the con-
current insurance according to the terms. This decision has never, to our
knowledge been overruled. It goes on the principle that strict compliance
with the words of the policy are necessary. In the light of more recent deci-
sions and now resting on more substantial grounds, the opinion of the court
seems good. Insurance Co. v. Norwood, 69 Fed. 71, 16 C. C. A., 136.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES-PROCEEDING FOR PROBATE OF WILL-WAHL v. FRANZ,
ioo Fed. 68o.-Held, a proceeding for the probate of a will is not a "suit of a
civic nature at law or in equity," so as to be cognizable in the first instance by
the Circuit Court of the United States or removable thereto from a State
court.
The real question here is, has the United States Court concurrent juris-
diction with State courts in an appealed contest as to validity, of a will involv-
ing the value of $20,000. and the parties to which are citizens of differ-
ent states. Gaines v. Fuentes. 920 U. S. io, seems to say that the Federal
Court has such jurisdiction, while the decision in re Frazer, Fed. Cas. W.
5,o68 would seem to hold contra. The point is not as yet fully and satisfac-
torily decided.
STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-EAU CLAIRE NAT. BANx vs. BENSON, 82 N. W.
REP. 6o4 (WisC.).-Where a certain statute, rather ambiguous in meaning, was
judicially construed by the Court of final resort shortly after its passage, Held,
an inquiry, subsequently, as to whether this construction was right or wrong,
could not be made.
The Court takes the position that when a statute is judicially interpreted
shortly after its passage, that such interpretation should be equally noticed by
the people of the State as the statute itself, hence, this interpretation whether
correct or otherwise becomes part of the law and can not be inquired into, or
corrected. State v. Ryan, 74 -N. W. 544. The present case seems to go very
far in the direction of giving importance to such decisions; the general rule
being that they are strong evidence of the legislature's intention, while in the
case under discussion such evidence is considered conclusive proof of this
intention. Potter's Dwarris on Stat., 47-51.
. STRIKE-INJUNCTIoN-COMBINATIONS OF WORKMEN-PICKETING-----cQUITY
JURISDICTION-CUMBERLAND GLASS MFG. Co. v. GLASS BOTTLE BLoWAERS'
ASSN. ET AL. 46 ATL. .2o8.-Evidence tended to show that strikers had resorted
to picketing, had from time to time forcibly interfered with persons seeking to
be employed in their places, and had also occasionally attacked the property
of plaintiff. Held, that in such a case a court of chancery has jurisdiction to
enjoin a continuing trespass or injury to property, though such trespass or
injury may also involve a crime.
The court simply ignored the crime involved: "Picketing" has usually
been held unlawful. Bek v. Prot. Union, 77 M. W. 13; Am. Steel and
Wire Co. v. Wire Uuions, etc., go Fed. 6o8 ; Lyons v. Wilkins, Eng. let. of
App. E899 ; Contra, Winslow Bros. Co. v. Building Trade Council, Case
and Comment, Aug., 1898. " The decision of the question must depend upon
the circumstances surrounding each case." A permanent guard in front of
citizens' houses or factories is in itself a nuisance. The interference with
prospective employees by the strikers warranted an injunction as " each man
is bound to observe the right of the employee and employer to seek employ-
ment or to employ undeterred by coercive influences."
TAX ON REFRIGERATOR CARS-INTER-STATE COMMERCE-PRESUMPTION IN
FAVOR OF ASszSSMENr-UNION RxFRIGERATOR Co. v. LYNCH, 20 Supt. Ct. Rep.
63 x-Plaintiff was a Kentucky corporation, doing a 
business of furnishing
refrigerator cars. It had no offices in Utah, and whenever Its cars happened to
be there, they were in transit or merely to stop or load. Utah laid a tax upon
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the average number of cars. Held, the state had this right, Amer. Refi. Co.
v. Hall, X74 U. S. 70 ; and as the complaint did not charge that more than the
average number of cars had been taxed, it will be presumed that assessment
was regular.
WAR REvENuz TAx-ExPREss COMPANIES, 20 Supt. Ct. Rep. 695. Held,
under the war revenue tax of 1898, making it the duty of every express Com-
pany to issue a bill of lading, with a one cent stamp duly attached and can-
celled, the Express Company could raise its charges to meet the tax and thus
shift the burden upon the shipper. The court grounds its decision on the fact
that there is nothing in the act that leads to the inference that it is unlawful
to shift the tax; in fact being an indirect tax, it leads to a contrary inference.
The reasonableness of the increased charge was not before the court, and the
right of the Company to shift the burden was decisive of the question.
But Harlan and McKenna, J. J., in dissenting, held that the act made it
the duty of the Company to provide and issue at his own expense, the bills
with stamps attachedand cancelled, but that whether the Company could then
raise its charges to shift the burden presented no Federal question.
WILus-CourTEsY-DEviSE TO HusBAND-Excrxo-N-HSBAND'S ADMNIS-
TRATION-LEGACIES-KERRIGAN ET AL. v. CoNNELLy, 46 Atl. 227.-Testatrix
devised a life estate in common to her husband and children in a portion of
her realty, subject to payment of legacies out of rents. Husband, who
received no other bequest, on failure of her executors, administered her estate
and received all said rents. Held, that his action showed no election to take
under the will in lieu of his more valuable right of tenancy by the curtesy.
The land, at his death, was held subject to the payment of the legacies,
although he had received a sufficient amount in rents to satisfy them, as hedid not receive said rents as administrator c. t. a. The burden of showing
election rests on the party asserting it. Worthington v. Wigonton, 2o Beav.67, 74. The mere acceptence of an appointment as an executor will not ingeneral be deemed a waiver of curtesy. Tyler v. Wheeler, i6o Mass. 2o6,
35, N. E. R. 666.
